The origins of the Bangladesh army lie more than 200 years back in the mercantile period of British expansion when representatives of its commercial capital arrived in India to trade and plunder. The first of the native armed forces commanded by foreigners were the armies organised by governmentsponsored companies, such as the British East India Company. Without these forces, this foreign capital could not have penetrated to the extent that it did, nor have been as financially successful. Thus, even in this early period, the army played an important role in development, albeit the development of Britain and the underdevelopment of India.
On the other hand, there were other 'races' who did not possess the required martial spirit. The Bengalis were decidedly placed in the latter category. The contempt for the Bengali population shown by the Pakistan army at the time of the crackdown in 1971 can in part be traced to these theories of racial superiority.
The Indian army was effectively insulated from the growing nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s against which it was often used, although during World War II this insulation began to break down. The growing economic disparity between East and West, the former's lack of a voice in its own affairs, the geographical absurdity of the country to begin with, and the great cultural differences between the two regions combined to produce an increasingly potent nationalist brew in the East. Accumulated grievances burst forth in large-scale student and workers riots during 1968-69, leading Those soldiers who wanted a new form of army were over-ruled and if they persisted, expelled. A number of outstanding young officers whose ideas had been transformed by the experience of fighting in the national liberation struggle were forced out. One of these was Major M. A. Jalil, a Bengali officer who had been on leave from his Pakistan regiment at the time of the crack-down and had organised resistance in his home area of Barisal. He then became the commander for the ninth sector (Jessore-Khulna).
Immediately after the war he was arrested and imprisoned for several months for trying to prevent Indian troops from taking industrial machinery and military weapons and equipment away to India.
Expelled from the army on his release, he helped to found a new party, the JSD (Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal, or 'patriotic socialist party'), which has been one of the most active left-wing parties since. Except for a two-week period after the soldiers' uprising of Besides the army, a new type of explicitly political armed force was also organised in Bangladesh with Indian assistance: the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) or 'national security force'. Similar to the Indian Central Reserve Police, the JRB was meant as both a counter-weight to the army, which Mujib did not fully trust, and as an 'internal security' instrument to carry out operations of a political nature which it was felt the police were incapable of handling. The
Rakkhi Bahini was frequently used to suppress opposition political rallies and demonstrations, control worker's strikes, pick up and interrogate leftists, clear slum dwellers out of the capital, and so forth.
The Rakkhi Bahini was trained by Indian army officers in Bangladesh, but later, because of antiIndian sentiment, JRB officer candidateswho, often had Awami League party connectionswere slFit to be trained at India's military academy at Dehra Dun. After this however the situation quickly began to disintegrate. Khaled Musharraf was widely regarded as 'India's man', and this aroused intense opposition within the army. This sentiment was combined with a smouldering class-resentment in the ranks. It was at this point that the Biplobi Gono Bahini (People's Revolutionary ArmyPRA)the underground armed wing of the JSD partyand the Biplobi Sainik Sangstha (the Revolutionary Soldiers Organisation) that the JSD and Abu Taher had been organising within the army, emerged on the scene. PRA organisers distributed thousands of leaflets throughout the country's military cantonments on November 5 and 6 claiming that the army officers were exploiting the Jawans (soldiers) for their "own selfish and ambitious scrambles for power through staging one putsch after another". (FEER, December 5, 1975) and calling on the Jawans to rise up against the upper echelons of the officer corps. This appeal struck a responsive chord. On the night of November 6, the soldiers began to rise, with a force that was to shake the State in Bangladesh, in the first soldiers' mutiny on such a scale since the The soldiers also called for a new structure of authority and decision-making in the army, including the end of discrimination between officers and soldiers; an end to recruitment of officers from the privileged classes and through special schools, rather from "among the soldiers" and changing of existing "British military rules and regulations". A number of demands were made for improved wages for soldiers and free accommodation. Soldiers also demanded the abolition of the 'batman' system where rank and file Jawans were used as house and personal servants by higher officers.
Although General Ziaur Rahman, in the pressure of the moment, indicated his general agreement with these demands, they obviously were not consistent with the type of army he envisioned. Troops from outlying areas poured into Dacca on the morning of November 7 and paraded through the city streets shouting slogans and firing their weapons into the air. There were two different political strands involved, some shouting in favour of the 'unity of revolutionary soldiers, workers, peasants and students' and others in support of Allah, Mushtaque, and against India (FEER, December 5, 1975 Foreign aid has been pouring into the country once again. The majority of the popularion seems unconcerned about the cancellation of parliamentary elections originally scheduled for March of this year.
But this situation will not last indefinitely. The Bengali population, long known for its volatile political passions, will not for long remain content with the lack of a political voice. The long-suffering peasantry will not forever remain passive. And most importantly the contradictions of slow and uneven capitalist development remain.
